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Abstract 
 
Canada’s courts in recent years have consistently recognized a high degree of privacy 
in the content of digital devices. Yet the law authorizing device searches on arrest and 
at the border has failed to reflect this higher interest. In both contexts, courts have 
assumed that the state has a compelling interest in immediate access to device data to 
advance pressing law enforcement objectives – but the claim is not supported by 
evidence. This paper builds upon earlier critical views of device search law and policy 
by demonstrating that searches are being carried out on arrest and at the border without 
clear limits, resulting in significant intrusions into personal privacy, and without 
effective avenues of recourse. 
 
Part I critically examines the Supreme Court’s justification in Fearon for 
authorizing device searches on arrest, including its dismissal of the US Supreme 
Court’s approach in Riley v California (requiring a warrant). It then presents evidence 
to support the dissent’s argument that the majority’s test provides ineffective guidance 
to police to avoid unreasonable searches, and that the exclusion of evidence is not an 
adequate remedy. Part II examines the Canada Border Services Agency’s rationale and 
practice for groundless device searches under the Customs Act. It considers proposals 
for reform, including a Parliamentary report in late 2017 recommending a requirement 
of reasonable suspicion. Finally, it argues that the guarantee against unreasonable 
search in section 8 of the Charter requires a warrant for device searches at the border, 
because the state’s interest in searching devices there is less pressing than the state’s 
interest in searching a person. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Canadians place a high value on their digital privacy and are concerned about its 
protection.1 The Supreme Court of Canada, in a series of decisions from Morelli2 to 
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1 Public Safety Canada, National Security Consultations: What We Learned (Ottawa: Hill + Knowlton 
Strategies, May 2017) at 4. 
 
2 R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 SCR 253 [Morelli].  
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Marakah,3 has agreed. As Justice Fish wrote in Morelli, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a 
search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the search and 
seizure of a personal computer.”4 Writing for the dissent in R v Fearon,5 Justice 
Karakatsanis held that  
 
[a] modern digital device is a portal to vast stores of information that are not 
truly on the device, and digital information has the potential to be more 
intensely and extensively personal than what might be found in a briefcase. 
Particularly for the “digital generation”, these devices contain far more 
information, and information far more personal, than does a private home.6 
 
The Court’s computer cases contain many similar passages.7 The higher 
privacy interest in personal data generally calls for a higher standard when assessing 
what constitutes a reasonable search under section 8 of the Charter.8 
 
 Two areas where an appropriate standard is lacking are search incident to 
arrest and search at the border.9 The government has sought to defend the state’s 
immediate need to access device data on arrest and at the border to advance pressing 
law enforcement objectives – but the claim is not supported by evidence and is 
contrary to common sense.  This paper builds upon earlier critical views of device 
search law and policy (canvased below) by demonstrating that searches are being 
carried out on arrest and at the border without clear limits, resulting in significant 
intrusions into personal privacy, and without effective avenues of recourse. 
 
Part I of this paper revisits the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v 
Fearon,10 which allows police to search a device incident to arrest without a warrant. 
It argues that the majority failed to set out a sufficiently clear and effective rule to 
guide police to avoid unreasonable searches before they occur. It also argues that the 
majority’s dismissal of the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Riley v 
                                                 
3 R v Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, [2017] 2 SCR 608 [Marakah]. 
4 Morelli, supra note 2 at para 2. 
 
5 Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] 3 SCR 621 [Fearon]. 
6 Ibid at para 152. 
7 The most extensive discussion is set out in R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60, [2013] 3 SCR 657 [Vu], discussed below; 
see also Morelli, supra note 2 at paras 1 and 105–106; R v Cole, 2012 SCC 34 at paras 47–49, [2012] 3 SCR 
34 [Cole]; and R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 at para 50, [2014] 2 SCR 212 [Spencer]. 
8 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11 [Charter]. See Vu, supra note 7 on the need for a separate search warrant for 
computers in the course of a warranted search; Fearon, supra note 5 for search on arrest; Spencer, supra 
note 7 requiring a warrant for police searches of basic subscriber information held by an internet service 
provider. 
9 A further context is in relation to lawful access; see Matthew Ponsford, “The Lawful Access Fallacy: 
Voluntary Warrantless Disclosures, Customer Privacy, and Government Requests for Subscriber 
Information” (2017) 15 CJLT 153. 
10 Fearon, supra note 5. 
98 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 69 
California11 (requiring a warrant) was premised on speculative and unsubstantiated 
assumptions about the threat posed by device data and the value of immediate access 
to it. Case law is cited in support of the dissent’s concerns about the “overly 
complicated”12 nature of the majority’s rule, and the potential for serious privacy 
invasions where the rule is misapplied. This part concludes by considering the 
dissent’s view that the exclusion of evidence would not be an adequate remedy for a 
serious breach in this context. A brief survey of remedies, or avenues of redress, 
including Charter and tort damages, and complaints to police or privacy oversight 
bodies, supports this view. 
 
 Part II of the paper examines the constitutional validity of device searches at 
the border, which are presently carried out without a warrant and without grounds. It 
looks first at law under which groundless searches at the border have been held 
reasonable under section 8 of the Charter. It then considers provisions of the Customs 
Act13 on which the Canada Border Services Agency claims authority to carry out 
device searches without grounds, and proposals for reform, including a report tabled 
in late 2017 by a Parliamentary committee recommending the standard of reasonable 
suspicion.14 The paper concludes by arguing that a reasonable search under section 8 
in this context requires a warrant, except in exigent circumstances, on the basis of a 
lower state interest in the search of a device at the border than in the search of a person. 
 
 
Part I: Search of devices upon arrest 
 
Police have long possessed the authority to carry out a search incident to arrest.15 
Whether and if this should extend to the search of devices on arrest draws on two 
earlier threads in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence: the privacy interest in computers 
and the test for assessing whether a search power is reasonable in relation to the 
Charter. I look briefly at these two points before proceeding to Fearon.  
 
 In Hunter v Southam,16 the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the 
guarantee against “unreasonable search” in section 8 of the Charter is to protect a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.17 A reasonable search is one in which a 
person’s privacy interest is reasonably outweighed by the state’s interest in law 
                                                 
11 Riley v California, 134 S Ct 2473 (2014), 189 L Ed (2d) 430 [Riley] (citations to the ‘slip opinion’). 
12 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 105.  
13 Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp) [Customs Act].  
14 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 
Protecting Canadians’ Privacy at the U.S. Border, (Ottawa: December 2017) [Protecting Canadians’ 
Privacy]. 
15 Cloutier v Langlois, [1990] 1 SCR 158, [1990] SCJ No 10 [Cloutier]. 
16 Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145, 11 DLR (4th) 641 [Hunter].  
17 Ibid at 159. 
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enforcement.18 In the ordinary course, this occurs where police obtain a warrant issued 
on probable grounds.19 A warrantless search would be prima facie unreasonable, the 
Court in Hunter held, but the Crown could rebut the presumption.20 The Court 
recognized that in some situations either the individual or state interest might be higher 
or lower, calling for a different standard than a warrant on probable grounds.21 The 
Supreme Court in Collins broadened this analysis by holding that a search will be 
reasonable under section 8 if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and 
if the search is carried out in a reasonable manner.22 The question in the case of a new 
search power is whether the law that authorizes it is reasonable under the balancing of 
interests noted in Hunter.  
 
 In Cloutier v Langlois,23 the Supreme Court recognized the validity of an 
ancillary police power upon arrest to carry out a brief pat down search or a search of 
a person’s possessions or immediate surroundings without a warrant or additional 
grounds.24 The power is confined within limits. A search on arrest must be connected 
to a criminal justice purpose related to the reason for the arrest, including safety, 
preventing escape, or gathering evidence.25 The power does not authorize police to 
search spaces beyond the immediate vicinity of the arrest26 or to take bodily samples.27 
The Court in Golden held that given the inherently invasive nature of strip searches, 
police need additional reasonable grounds to carry them out upon arrest.28 
 
 As cellphones became pervasive, courts grappled with whether search incident 
to arrest could extend to digital devices. Courts had been divided on the issue, due in 
part to a disagreement as to whether phones or computers are comparable to briefcases 
                                                 
18 Ibid at 160. 
19 Ibid at 160, 167. 
20 Ibid at 161. 
21 Ibid at 167–8: “The state’s interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the 
individual’s interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. 
History has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement as the threshold for subordinating the 
expectation of privacy to the needs of law enforcement. Where the state’s interest is not simply law 
enforcement as, for instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s interest is not simply 
his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant 
standard might well be a different one.” 
22 R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 278, 38 DLR (4th) 508.  
23 Cloutier, supra note 15. 
24 Ibid at 182, referring to the balance of interests; see also R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607 at para 27, 144 
DLR (4th) 193 [Stillman]; R v Caslake, [1998] 1 SCR 51 at paras 12, 14, 155 DLR (4th) 19 [Caslake]; R v 
Golden, 2001 SCC 83 at paras 44, 49, 75 and 104, [2001] 3 SCR 679 [Golden]; R v Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 at 
paras 49 and 52, [2010] 1 SCR 851; and Fearon, supra note 5 at para 45. 
25 Cloutier, supra note 15 at 186. 
26 Ibid at 180; Caslake, supra note 24 at para 40. 
27 Stillman, supra note 24 at para 89. 
28 Golden, supra note 24 at paras 98–99. 
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or other physical receptacles.29 By the time Fearon had reached the Supreme Court, 
the Court had settled this more fundamental question in R v Vu.30  
 
 Vu dealt with the issue of whether a warrant to search a place in which a 
computer was found allowed police to search data on the computer. Justice Cromwell, 
writing for a unanimous Court, held that a separate warrant is required because “[t]he 
privacy interests implicated by computer searches are markedly different from those 
at stake in searches of receptacles such as cupboards and filing cabinets.”31 In arriving 
at this conclusion, Justice Cromwell declined to accept a series of propositions that 
would become central to the majority’s reasoning in Fearon. The Crown had argued 
that after-the-fact review of the reasonableness of a computer search was adequate 
protection of privacy in these cases.32 The Crown also asserted that “computer searches 
are not all alike and different principles of search and seizure may be engaged 
depending on the circumstances in which the authorities encounter a computer.”33 It 
also contended that “requiring specific authority to search computers would restrict 
access to valuable information and undermine legitimate investigations.”34 Justice 
Cromwell dismissed all three arguments in light of the emphasis he placed on the 
privacy interests at stake in a computer. 
 
 The Vu decision featured an extended section – a short essay – on why 
computers are special and distinct, marking the culmination of such pronouncements 
from Morelli onward.35 Beginning with the assertion that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a 
more intrusive invasion of privacy than the search of a personal or home computer,”36 
Justice Cromwell set out four distinguishing characteristics. Computers store 
“immense amounts of information” of an incomparable “scale and variety”, engaging 
the “biographical core of personal information” referred to in R v Plant.37 Computers 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., R v Polius (2009), 196 CRR (2d) 288, 2009 CarswellOnt 4213 (Ont SC) holding that devices 
are not like briefcases and R v Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 at para 63, 77 WCB (2d) 469 per MacKenzie J 
holding that: “… the information contained in the BlackBerry […] is not different in nature from what might 
be disclosed by searching a notebook, a briefcase or a purse found in the same circumstances.” See also R 
v Leask, 2008 ONCJ 25 at para 16, 167 CRR (2d) 267 per Justice Nadel holding: “I see no intrinsic difference 
between the effects of the computer search at issue here and the intrusiveness or the embarrassment attendant 
upon a search of a wallet or purse or the requirement to turn out of one’s pockets or to be subjected to a 
detailed examination of the contents of one’s suitcase.” Notably, both of the latter decisions pertain to 
devices that pre-date the advent of the smartphone. 
30 Vu, supra note 7. 
31 Ibid at para 24. 
32 Ibid at paras 20, 34. 
33 Ibid at para 36.  
34 Ibid. 
35 The passage in Vu, supra note 7, appears at paras 40–45, drawing on earlier holdings in Morelli, supra 
note 2 at paras 1, 105–106; Cole, supra note 7 at paras 47–49. 
36 Vu, supra note 7 at para 45, citing Morelli, supra note 2 at para 105 per Fish J.  
37 R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281 at 293, 24 CR (4th) 47. Cited in Vu, supra note 7 at para 41. 
2018] PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN DIGITAL DEVICES 101 
contain information “automatically generated, often unbeknownst to the user.”38 A 
computer also “retains files and data even after users think that they have destroyed 
them.”39 Finally, the search carried out in one place is not “a meaningful limitation 
with respect to computer searches.”40 Unlike documents found in a filing cabinet, 
information accessible on a computer can be located elsewhere. As a consequence of 
these “numerous and striking differences” between computers and physical 
receptacles, Justice Cromwell held that computers “call for distinctive treatment under 
s. 8 of the Charter.”41 
 
 The following year, the Supreme Court turned to the issue of whether and when 
a device search incident to arrest may be reasonable in R v Fearon.42 The accused in 
this case was arrested for the armed robbery of a jeweler in Toronto in 2009. Police 
found a cellphone in Fearon’s pocket in the course of a pat-down search. The phone 
was unlocked and the officer viewed a number of text messages and photos, including 
the photo of a gun.43 The phone was examined again later that evening by a second 
officer who found an unsent text message stating “We did it were the jewlery at nigga 
burrrrrrrrrrr” [sic].44 
 
 The Court’s holdings from Morelli to Vu had given rise to the expectation that 
a phone search on arrest would require a warrant.45 Yet the Court was divided on the 
question 4 to 3. Justice Cromwell, writing for the majority (McLachlin CJ, along with 
Moldaver and Wagner JJ), held that a search incident to arrest could extend to a digital 
device – without a warrant – under certain conditions. The majority had unsettled 
expectations in Fearon due in large part to a shift in perspective on the state’s interest 
in this context. 
 
                                                 
38 Vu, supra note 7 at para 42.  
39 Ibid at para 43. 
40 Ibid at para 44. 
41 Ibid at para 45. 
42 Fearon, supra note 5. 
43 In a case comment on Fearon, Jordan Fine notes the limited capacity of the phone seized in this case, 
raising the possibility that the majority’s perception of the potential impact of the rule at issue was affected 
in part by the limitations of the particular device in this case and the limited data it yielded when Fearon 
was searched: “Fearon’s phone is described in the trial court judgment as a Telus LG285, a discontinued 
flip phone within the ‘burner’ class of devices, lacking a touchscreen, high-resolution camera, and social 
media application capabilities. To suggest that this phone bears any similarity to an iPhone 6 is akin to 
comparing a MacBook Air to a Commodore 64.” Jordan Fine, “Leaving Dumb Phones Behind: A 
Commentary on the Warrantless Searches of Smartphone Data Granted in R v Fearon” (2015) 13 CJLT 171 
at 179. See also Colton Fehr & Jared Biden, “Divorced From (Technological) Reality: A Response to the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Reasons in R. v. Fearon” (2015) 20:1 Can Crim L Rev 93 at 100, that “identity 
protection functions” such as touch and face-ID, “raise additional constitutional concerns about the rights 
to silence and against self-incrimination, as well as provide additional privacy interests that were not given 
weight by either the majority or the dissent in Fearon.” 
44 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 107. 
45 Steven Penney, “Searches of Digital Devices Incident to Arrest: R v Fearon” (2014) 23:2 Const Forum 
Const 1 at 2. 
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  The shift was premised on three propositions. First, law enforcement agents 
have a compelling interest in immediate access to cell phones on arrest due to the 
potential misuse of a device to “evade or resist” police, “call for ‘backup’,” or signal 
others to escape or destroy evidence.46 Device searches are thus unlike the taking of 
bodily samples considered in Stillman,47 since there is no urgency to those searches, 
whereas the search of data on arrest may in some cases be pressing.48 But notably, 
Justice Cromwell spoke throughout this part of his analysis in a hypothetical tenor: 
“[p]rompt access” to data “may serve the purpose of identifying accomplices,” etc.49 
Aside from passing mention to a single case – a US decision from 2008 (pre-dating 
smart phones) – Justice Cromwell cited no statistics or other evidence as to the 
frequency or usefulness of data gleaned from searches on arrest, and no cases to 
demonstrate that his assertions about state urgency here were more than hypothetical. 
He also omitted to address Chief Justice Roberts’ significant discussion and dismissal 
of this argument (explored further below) in the analogous United States Supreme 
Court decision from earlier that year in Riley v California.50 
 
 The second premise was that although some device searches “may constitute 
very significant intrusions of privacy,” as Justice Cromwell noted, “not every search 
is inevitably a significant intrusion.”51 This entailed a clear break from the thrust of 
Vu, where the focus was on the capacity of computers as such. By contrast, the limited 
search in this case, involving a text message and the photo of a handgun, was held to 
be “minimal,” and formed the basis for distinguishing between minor and more 
invasive computer searches.52 For the majority: 
 
a cell phone search is completely different from the seizure of bodily 
samples in Stillman and the strip search in Golden. Such searches are 
invariably and inherently very great invasions of privacy and are, in 
addition, a significant affront to human dignity. That cannot be said of cell 
phone searches incident to arrest.53 
 
His earlier opinion in Vu on the distinctness of computers – the theory of its four 
capacities – now only merited a brief and passing mention.54  
                                                 
46 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 48.  
47 Stillman, supra note 24. 
48 Ibid at paras 49 and 59. 
49 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 48. 
50 Riley, supra note 11. 
51 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 54. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid at para 55; Stillman and Golden, supra note 24. 
54 Ibid at para 51. Justice Cromwell also reframed his characterization of the nature of computers here by 
speaking of their special capacities in the conditional tense: at para 51 of Fearon, supra note 5, computers 
“may have immense storage capacity, may generate information about intimate details of the user’s interests, 
habits and identity without the knowledge or intent of the user, may retain information even after the user 
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A third key consideration was that “a person who has been lawfully arrested 
has a lower reasonable expectation of privacy than persons not under lawful arrest”.55 
The heightened privacy interest in digital devices did not change the calculus here. 
Nor did Justice Cromwell seek to reconcile the notion of an arrestee’s lower 
expectation of privacy with the point he noted earlier in the opinion (and in Vu) about 
device searches providing “access to information that is in no meaningful sense ‘at’ 
the location of the search”.56 
   
By extending the power of search incident to arrest to include digital devices, 
the Supreme Court declined to follow the approach of the US Supreme Court in 
Riley.57 Before considering Justice Cromwell’s justification for this, a brief 
consideration of Riley lends useful context.  
 
The US Supreme Court in Riley held that the balance of state and individual 
interests does not favour warrantless searches because the search of a phone on arrest 
did not advance the state interests of officer safety and preservation of evidence that 
justify warrantless searches incident to arrest.58 The finding here was premised on the 
holding that digital data “implicates substantially greater individual privacy interests 
than a brief physical search” and that data on a phone “cannot itself be used as a 
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate an arrestee’s escape.”59 Concerns 
about the use of phone data as a means of warning officers about potentially 
threatening conduct of other parties was a concern “better addressed through 
consideration of case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent 
circumstances.”60 The Court also favoured the warrant requirement here as consistent 
with its “general preference to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through 
categorical rules.”61 
 
 Justice Cromwell did not engage with the US Supreme Court’s contrary 
analysis of the potential danger digital data may pose on arrest. As Tim Quigley has 
noted, Justice Cromwell failed to explain why the concerns he raised about potential 
misuses of a device could not be addressed by the exigent circumstances exception, as 
                                                 
thinks that it has been destroyed, and may provide access to information that is in no meaningful sense ‘at’ 
the location of the search” [emphasis added]. 
55 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 56, citing R v Beare, [1988] 2 SCR 387 at 413, 55 DLR (4th) 481.  
56 Ibid at para 51; and Vu, supra note 7 at para 44. Justice Cromwell’s point here also runs contrary to the 
Court’s recent approach in Marakah, supra note 3 (a case dealing with privacy in text messages) to de-
emphasize where a search takes place in favour of an emphasis on what is being searched: see Marakah, 
supra note 3 at paras 16–20. 
57 Riley, supra note 11. 
58 Ibid at 10–15. 
59 Ibid at 2 and 8–22. 
60 Ibid at 2–3 and 10–12. 
61 Ibid at 4 and 22. 
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both the dissent and the USSC had held.62 Justice Cromwell instead sought to justify 
the majority’s approach by distinguishing device searches from strip searches.63 The 
only other categorical exclusion from search incident to arrest the Court has 
recognized is the one set out in Stillman, prohibiting the collection of bodily samples 
on arrest.64 While that was justified because such searches are always invasive, cell 
phone searches are only potentially so. Justice Cromwell was also optimistic that 
“meaningful limits”65 could be placed on the search of electronic devices on arrest 
comparable to those imposed in the case of strip searches in R v Golden66 – a case in 
which the majority held that strip searches are “inherently humiliating and degrading 
… regardless of the manner in which they are carried out”.67  
 
   On behalf of the majority, Justice Cromwell then set out a test for when 
police can search a phone or digital device on arrest involving four conditions:  
 
(1) The arrest was lawful;  
(2) The search is truly incidental to the arrest in that the police have a reason 
based on a valid law enforcement purpose to conduct the search, and that 
reason is objectively reasonable. The valid law enforcement purposes in this 
context are:  
(a) Protecting the police, the accused, or the public;  
(b) Preserving evidence; or  
(c) Discovering evidence, including locating additional suspects, 
in situations in which the investigation will be stymied or significantly 
hampered absent the ability to promptly search the cell phone incident to 
arrest;  
(3) The nature and the extent of the search are tailored to the purpose of the 
search; and  
(4) The police take detailed notes of what they have examined on the device 
and how it was searched.68  
 
 To be clear, the majority contemplated a limited search: “in practice”, a 
suitably tailored search would involve “only recently sent or drafted emails, texts, 
photos and the call log”.69 Justice Cromwell also added: “[b]ut these are not rules, and 
other searches may in some circumstances be justified. The test is whether the nature 
                                                 
62 Tim Quigley, “R v Fearon: A Problematic Decision” (2015) 15 CR (7th) 281 at 283. 
63 Fearon, supra note 5 at paras 60–62.  
64 Stillman, supra note 24. 
65 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 62.  
66 Golden, supra note 24. 
67 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 62, citing Golden, supra note 24 at para 90. 
68 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 83. 
69 Ibid at para 76. 
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and extent of the search are tailored to the purpose for which the search may lawfully 
be conducted.”70 
 
 The majority was thus reluctant to set out a clear and categorical rule, and 
content to have the validity of device searches assessed after the fact. It is difficult to 
reconcile this with Vu. Justice Cromwell in that case cited Hunter for the point that 
protecting against unreasonable intrusions requires a means of preventing them before 
they occur.71 In the case of computers, the Court held that this “calls for a specific 
assessment of ‘whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left alone 
by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding’”.72 In Fearon, 
this assessment could now be carried out by police officers and only after-the-fact by 
courts. 
 
  Justice Karakatsanis, joined by Justices Abella and LeBel in dissent, held the 
majority’s test was “overly complicated” and called instead for a rule that is “clear, 
practical and effective.”73 Largely consistent with Riley, the dissent held that a 
reasonable device search on arrest required a warrant, except in cases of exigent 
circumstances. The latter would require reasonable suspicion of an imminent safety 
threat, or reasonable belief that it would prevent the imminent loss or destruction of 
evidence.74 The difference of opinion as to how to strike the right balance here turned 
on a higher value the dissent placed on the privacy interests at issue. Faithful to the 
Court’s reasoning on privacy in computers from Morelli to Vu, Justice Karakatsanis 
sought to apply this to the arrest context by drawing comparisons to the home and to 
the body: 
 
These devices provide a window not just into the owner’s most intimate 
actions and communications, but into his mind, demonstrating private, even 
uncommunicated, interests, thoughts and feelings. Thus, like the search of 
the body and of the home, the warrantless search of personal digital devices 
as an incident of arrest is not proportionate to our privacy interests.75 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. One important proviso, at para 78, was that “generally, the search of the entire contents of a cell 
phone or a download of its contents is not permitted as a search incident to arrest”. See also Nader Hasan, 
“A Step Forward or Just a Sidestep? Year Five of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Digital Age” (2015) 
71 SCLR (2d) 439 at 441, arguing that “the only way to achieve meaningful after-the-fact review is to 
require that police electronically record all warrantless cell phone searches.” 
71 Vu, supra note 7 at para 46, citing Hunter, supra note 16 at 160. 
72 Vu, supra note 7 at para 47, citing Hunter, supra note 16 at 159–60. 
73 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 105. 
74 Ibid at paras 106, 179. At para 158: Even a search in these circumstances should “not extend that search 
beyond the scope of the grounds permitting the search”.   
75 Ibid at para 152; see also para 101: “[p]rivate digital devices record not only our core biographical 
information but our conversations, photos, browsing interests, purchase records, and leisure pursuits. Our 
digital footprint is often enough to reconstruct the events of our lives, our relationships with others, our likes 
and dislikes, our fears, hopes, opinions, beliefs and ideas. Our digital devices are windows to our inner 
private lives.” 
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A rule inviting police to carry out only cursory searches of recent texts and photos 
would not suffice, because it is “neither practical nor principled.”76  Agreeing with the 
US Supreme Court in Riley on this point, she held that giving police authority for 
“cursory searches” would readily lead to infringements, and be no less invasive than 
allowing police to conduct a warrantless “cursory walk inside a suspect’s home.”77  
 
  The majority’s test would also “generate uncertainty for the police and result 
in increased after-the-fact litigation of searches” and “increased numbers of searches 
that were later determined to be unconstitutional.”78 Justice Karakatsanis was critical 
of the role police were asked to play here: 
 
Fundamentally, my colleague’s approach puts the balancing decision in the 
hands of the police. I doubt not that police officers faced with this decision 
would act in good faith, but I do not think that they are in the best position 
to determine “with great circumspection” whether the law enforcement 
objectives clearly outweigh the potentially significant intrusion on privacy 
in the search of a personal cell phone or computer (para. 80). If they are 
wrong, the subsequent exclusion of the evidence will not remedy the initial 
privacy violation.79  
 
Even if a test were fashioned on the basis of reasonable belief, the problem of 
potentially irreparable invasions of privacy would remain:  
 
… the exclusion of the evidence obtained at a subsequent trial does not 
render the search harmless. The arrested person’s privacy will have been 
unjustifiably infringed, and their general sense of freedom and security 
affected […]. Only a requirement of pre-authorization can give people 
confidence that their privacy will be respected.80  
 
                                                 
76 Ibid at para 162.  
77 Ibid at para 163. See also Riley, supra note 11 at 23–24. Critical reception of Fearon concurred. Tim 
Quigley, supra note 62, noted at 282: “The third requirement is extremely loose. Even a clear rule stipulating 
that only recent items may be examined begs the question of what is recent — and the police have been 
given the role of deciding that question. the additional qualification, at paragraph 76, that more extensive 
searches may sometimes be justified, is more distressing. No guidance has been given for when a cell phone 
search may be more intrusive. This places the police in the predicament of attempting to predict when they 
may search more extensively, but it also invites, rather than constrains, these further searches because the 
Court has explicitly said that it may approve them.”  
78 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 164. 
79 Ibid at para 172 [emphasis added]. 
80 Ibid at para 169 [emphasis added]. 
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Citing the Court’s earlier decisions in Dyment81 and Hunter,82 Justice Karakatsanis 
affirmed the point that adequately protecting privacy requires a means of preventing 
unjustified searches before they occur.83  
 
 The majority found the searches of Fearon’s phone to violate section 8, but 
given the limited nature of the search and the compelling interest in locating the gun 
depicted in the photo, the evidence was admitted. The dissent viewed the impact of the 
breaches as “very serious” and held that the evidence should be excluded.84  
 
 
Assessing the impact of Fearon 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine post-Fearon case law in detail to assess 
the effectiveness of the majority’s test. It may also be too early to attempt this. A search 
on canlii.org for citations to the Supreme Court’s decision in Fearon brings up 132 
cases at present, but few involve searches that took place after the Court’s decision 
was published in December of 2014. However, I briefly draw on case law here to 
support the dissent’s concern in Fearon that the majority’s rule fails to provide clear 
guidance to the police, giving rise to what can be profoundly invasive searches. I begin 
with the first point – Fearon as a guide. 
 
 R v Moreau85 concerned a search in December of 2015. Police found a phone 
on the accused when arresting him for drug possession. On the suspicion that he might 
also have been involved in a weapons offence, the officer searched the phone, 
examining a series of pictures, looking for “‘trophy pics’” that he believed to be 
common in gun offence cases.86 The court held the search to be unlawful for not being 
truly incident to arrest (the purpose being drugs not weapons) and excluded the 
evidence at issue. The case is unclear as to the extent of the officer’s understanding of 
the rule in Fearon. But it invites consideration of whether the search would have 
unfolded had the Supreme Court’s rule in Fearon been categorical (no phone search 
without a warrant, except in exigent circumstances). 
 
 A similar error occurred in R v Kossick.87 In August of 2016, police seized a 
phone when arresting the accused for drug possession. Placing the phone in the front 
area of his cruiser, the officer saw incoming messages appearing on screen, suggesting 
involvement in trafficking. A few minutes later, at the detachment, the officer carried 
out a more extensive search of the device for further evidence of trafficking. The court 
                                                 
81 R v Dyment [1988] 2 SCR 417, 55 DLR (4th) 503.  
82 Hunter, supra note 16. 
83 Fearon, supra note 5 at 169, citing Justice La Forest in Dyment, supra note 81 at 430; and Hunter, ibid at 
160. 
84 Fearon, supra note 5 at paras 191 and 197. 
85 R v Moreau, 2016 ONCJ 564, 133 WCB (2d) 166.  
86 Ibid at para 12. 
87 R v Kossick, 2017 SKPC 67, 141 WCB (2d) 578.  
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held that neither search was truly incidental to arrest given that the arrest was for 
possession. It was also contrary to the rule in Fearon in that a search to discover 
evidence is only allowed where the investigation will be significantly hampered 
otherwise, which was not the case here. Once again, the facts invite consideration of 
whether the second, more extensive search would have unfolded had the rule in Fearon 
been categorical. 
 
 A third example can be found in R v Goodwin,88 pertaining to a search that 
unfolded in January of 2015. Police carried out a “cursory” search of Facebook 
messages on the accused’s phone at the station, roughly an hour after his arrest for 
trafficking. The officers testified that their purpose was discovery, but the court held 
there to be insufficient evidence that the investigation would have been significantly 
hampered without a prompt search.89 While there was “some effort by the police to 
document what they were doing by way of screen shots that are really unreadable”, 
this was held to be “the only place where Justice Cromwell’s direction [in Fearon] 
was considered.”90 This might only be evidence of police lacking diligence or good 
training; but here too, it might also be read as the result of a rule that is “overly 
complicated.”91 
 
 Case law also supports the dissent’s concern in Fearon that a warrantless 
power to search devices on arrest would easily and readily lead to significant invasions 
of privacy not adequately remedied by the possibility of exclusion. 
 
 In R v Wasilewski,92 the accused was charged with possession for the purpose 
of trafficking. Police seized her cellphone upon arrest and conducted a cursory search. 
Five days later, acting without a warrant, police conducted a more extensive search, 
including an inventory of some 2800 photos, many of which depicted the accused.93  
 
 In R v Adeshina,94 the accused took issue with the police search of a phone 
found in a vehicle in which he was arrested for drug trafficking. Eight months after the 
arrest, police carried out a warrantless “data [dump]” of the entire content of the phone, 
resulting in some 682 pages of material.95 The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan 
considered the impact on the accused’s privacy under section 24(2) of the Charter to 
be “severe.”96 The search revealed data on “the accused’s personal choices in lifestyle 
                                                 
88 R v Goodwin, 2016 NSSC 283, 134 WCB (2d) 239.  
89 Ibid at para 84. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 105. 
92 R v Wasilewski, 2016 SKCA 112, 133 WCB (2d) 321 (overturning the trial judge’s decision to exclude 
evidence). 
93 Ibid at para 7. 
94 R v Adeshina, 2013 SKQB 414, 110 WCB (2d) 836.  
95 Ibid at para 8. 
96 Ibid at para 34. 
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and adult ‘XXX’ movies, which he downloaded, as well as ‘selfies’, photos of the 
accused without his shirt on.”97 
 
 In R v Powell,98 police found a Blackberry on the accused when arresting him 
as a party to kidnapping and other serious charges. The device in this case was 
password protected. At the station an hour after the arrest, police gained access to and 
downloaded all of the data on the device in the form of a document amounting to some 
3775 pages of material, including images, video, and text messages. An initial, cursory 
search of the material was held to be valid in exigent circumstances, but a more 
extensive search twelve days later (after the complainant had been rescued) was 
invalid, resulting in the exclusion under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
 
 
Remedies for unlawful device searches on arrest 
 
Where a device search violates section 8, exclusion is one remedy. But in casting doubt 
on whether this would be truly adequate in the case of a serious invasion of privacy, 
Justice Karakatsanis’ comments raise an important issue: what other remedies or 
avenues of recourse are available in this context? A brief survey demonstrates that the 
options are few, relatively inaccessible, and of limited effect.  
 
 Damages under section 24(1) of the Charter are possible in theory, but are 
likely to be rare, due to procedural and substantive hurdles. The Supreme Court set out 
a five-part test for Charter damages in Vancouver (City) v Ward.99 An applicant must 
first establish that a Charter right has been breached and why damages are a just and 
appropriate remedy, in terms of whether they would “fulfill one or more of the related 
functions of compensation, vindication of the rights, and/or deterrence of future 
breaches.”100 The burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate “countervailing factors 
[that] defeat the functional considerations that support a damage award”, including the 
availability of an alternative remedy and concerns for good governance.101 The Court 
did not specify that excluding evidence constitutes an alternative that renders damages 
redundant,102 but lower courts have held this to be so.103 Finally, the Court considers 
quantum. 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 R v Powell, 2017 ONSC 6482, 142 WCB (2d) 636.  
99 Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28 [Ward]. 
100 Ibid at para 4. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid at para 34. 
103 In Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty of Animals v. Hunter, 2014 ONSC 6084 at para 53, 322 
CRR (2d) 189, a case involving a 24(1) damages application for a section 8 breach, the court held that 
exclusion was an adequate remedy. Hunter was applied in Abboud v Ottawa Police Services Board, 2016 
ONSC 1052, 265 ACWS (3d) 238, a case involving an application for damages under 24(1) for the search 
of a computer pursuant to an invalid warrant. Granting a summary motion to dismiss this part of the 
application, at paras 46 to 49, Smith J agreed with the defendant police board’s submission that exclusion 
(resulting in acquittal) was “more responsive to the breach” of section 8 here, and also held that the plaintiff 
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Even if the Ward test were applied favourably, however, a damage award 
would likely be modest here. In Ward itself, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s 
award of $5000 for a police station strip search in a case of mistaken identity. In a 
device case, the defendant would likely cite Fearon for the proposition that a device 
search is not inherently degrading or necessarily as invasive as a strip search.104  
 
Procedurally, the Supreme Court in Ward indicated that “[p]rovincial 
criminal courts […] do not have the power to award damages under s. 24(1).”105 In 
some provinces, small claims court has served as a venue for seeking a remedy under 
24(1), but the awards have been modest.106 The vast majority of case law on section 
24(1) applications for damages pertain to superior court actions – a forum in which 
costs for counsel and disbursements are not trivial, and the risk of an adverse cost order 
is also an issue. 
 
 A further possible remedy is a tort action for breach of privacy. In four 
Canadian provinces, the tort is codified in a manner similar to section 1 of British 
Columbia Privacy Act, which states “[i]t is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, 
for a person, wilfully and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another.”107 
“Claim of right” here has been interpreted to mean “an honest belief in a state of facts 
which, if it existed, would be a legal justification or excuse.”108 At least one decision 
has recognized a claim of right in a matter involving a mistake of law.109 Section 2 of 
                                                 
had failed to establish that “monetary damages are needed in order to compensate them or that monetary 
damages are required to highlight the harm that the breach caused to society… [or that] the police officers 
and Police Board must be deterred to ensure state compliance with the Charter.” On this latter point, he 
noted, the plaintiffs “did not produce any evidence that the Police had a general practice of obtaining search 
warrants for residences without ensuring that they had reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a search 
warrant.” See also, Rotondo v Ottawa Police Services Board, 2016 ONSC 8101, 275 ACWS (3d) 187, 
applying the reasoning in Abboud to another section 24(1) case relating to a section 8 breach, at paras 31 
and 32. 
104 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 61. 
105 Ward, supra note 99 at para 58. See also R v 974649 Ontario Inc (Dunedin), 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 
575 at paras 56–59; and R v Wetzel, 2013 SKCA 143, [2014] 2 WWR 559, overturning a damage award 
granted in the course of a criminal trial in Provincial Court, citing both Dunedin and Ward. 
106 See, e.g. the Ontario Court of Justice (Small Claims) decisions in Lamka v Waterloo Regional Police 
Services Board, [2012] OJ No 5591, 2012 CarswellOnt 14587 (Ont SC), resulting in a $5000 award for an 
unlawful strip search, and Probert v Galloway 2011 CanLII 100790 (Ont SCSM), in which section 24(1) 
was considered but a remedy was granted under tort law; see also AK v R, 2014 NLPC 0113, 350 Nfld & 
PEIR 180, a case in which an order for costs was made as a section 24(1) remedy. 
107 Privacy Act, RSBC c 373, s 1(1) (British Columbia); see also The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24, s 2 
(Saskatchewan); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22, s 3(1) (Newfoundland & Labrador); and The Privacy 
Act, CCSM c P125, s 2(1) (Manitoba). On the scope and differences between the Acts, see Chris Hunt & 
Nikta Shirazian, “Canada’s Statutory Privacy Torts in Commonwealth Perspective” (2016) Oxford U 
Comparative L Forum 3, online: <ouclf.isucomp.org/articles/>; see also Chris Hunt, “The Common Law’s 
Hodgepodge Protection of Privacy” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 161. 
108 Davis v McArthur, 10 DLR (3d) 250 at 253, [1969] BCJ No 249 (QL), citing Boyd, C in Rex v Johnson 
(1904) 7 OLR 525 at 530, 24 CLT 266; cited affirmatively by the Court of Appeal in Hollinsworth v BCTV 
(1998), 59 BCLR (3d) 121, 83 ACWS (3d) 525 (CA) and noted in Hunt and Shirazian, ibid. 
109 Peters-Brown v Regina District Health Board, 136 Sask R 126, [1996], 1 WWR 337 (QB). 
2018] PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN DIGITAL DEVICES 111 
the BC Privacy Act further complicates the issue of police liability (in ways similar to 
other legislation) by excluding the conduct of a “peace officer acting in the course of 
his or her duty to prevent, discover or investigate crime” where privacy infringing 
conduct is not “disproportionate to the gravity of the crime or matter”.110 Thus, for 
example, in an investigation for trafficking or fraud, even if police carry out an 
invasive device search following an unlawful arrest – in flagrant breach of Fearon – a 
tort claim may be barred because police acted under a reasonable suspicion. Section 4 
restricts actions under the Act to the province’s superior courts, giving rise to the same 
monetary considerations noted above.  
 
The common law tort of invasion of privacy presents further challenges. As 
defined by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige,111 a trier of fact would need 
to conclude that the search of a device constituted an intrusion upon a person’s private 
affairs that would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”112 The plaintiff must 
establish intentional or reckless conduct, the lack of lawful justification, and that a 
“reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, 
humiliation or anguish.”113 The scope of “lawful justification” in the case of a device 
search is unclear; it might be interpreted strictly, but it might also afford a police 
service a defence where officers misapply Fearon but act in good faith.  
 
 Finally, the subject of an unlawful and invasive device search might complain 
to a police complaints commission or the federal or provincial privacy commissioner. 
A person might choose to make a complaint to a police oversight body where concerns 
about a search focus on the fact that sensitive data had been accessed, rather than that 
new records have been created or disclosed (i.e., device data had been copied). In this 
case, a complaint could lead to discipline of officers involved and/or 
recommendations.114 By contrast, a complaint would be made to a provincial or federal 
privacy commissioner where records have been “collected” in relation to one’s 
personal data (e.g., copies of data on a device were created and retained and possibly 
shared). On the basis of misuse or over-collection of one’s personal information, a 
                                                 
110 Privacy Act, RSBC C 373, supra note 107, s 2. See also s. 4(1)(d) of the Saskatchewan Privacy Act, 
supra note 107; s. 5(1)(d) of the Newfoundland Privacy Act, supra note 107; s. 5(e) of the Manitoba Privacy 
Act, supra note 107. 
111 Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, 346 DLR (4th) 34. 
112 Ibid at para 70. 
113 Ibid at para 71. 
114 In the case of an RCMP officer, a complaint is first investigated internally, which may result in a 
disciplinary order under s. 45 of the RCMP Act, RSC 1985, c R-10. A complaint may also result in an 
external review under Part VI and VII of the Act by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for 
the RCMP. The CRCC’s investigation may result in a report and recommendations to the RCMP 
Commissioner and possibly also the Minister of Public Safety. A complaint to the British Columbia Police 
Complaints Commissioner under the Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367, which applies to forces other than the 
RCMP, can result, under Part 11 of the Act, in the imposition of disciplinary measures including training, 
suspension without pay, or ultimately dismissal. See the comparable disciplinary measures in section 85 of 
Ontario’s Police Services Act, RSO 1990, c P 15.  
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privacy commissioner may have the power to order the records destroyed, in addition 
to making recommendations.115 
 
 The avenues of redress canvassed here are not easily accessed, or limited in 
terms of their potential effect. Realistically, in the case of an unlawful and invasive 
device search that does not proceed to prosecution, a meaningful remedy is unlikely. 
Where the matter does proceed to prosecution and evidence is excluded under section 
24(2) of the Charter, the cases noted earlier demonstrate ways in which exclusion 
serves as only a partial remedy for what can be a significant violation of a person’s 
dignity.  
 
Legislation governing the powers of provincial and federal privacy 
commissioners might be amended to empower commissioners to award damages for 
violations of statutory privacy rights, as privacy advocates have urged in the past.116 
A preferable course, however, would be to return to the fork in the road the Supreme 
Court faced in Fearon, where the majority took a more questionable route. Not only 
was the majority’s test inconsistent with the computer cases from Morelli to Vu, it also 
rested on speculative and dubious assumptions about the utility of immediate access 
to data. The US Supreme Court made a more prudent decision in imposing a 
categorical rule. The Court in Riley cited its earlier decision in Michigan v  Summers 
for the proposition that “[i]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the 
competing interests […] ‘must in large part be done on a categorical basis—not in an 
ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.’”117 As technology 
continues to advance and breaches flowing from the confusion around Fearon 
continue to occur, the Supreme Court might have cause to reconsider its position 
sooner than it might otherwise.118 
 
 
                                                 
115 For example, in British Columbia, where a person’s data has been downloaded or copied from a person 
digital device by a non-RCMP police officer unlawfully, one might argue that the BC Privacy Commissioner 
would have jurisdiction to investigate a complaint for the improper “collection” of personal data, contrary 
to s. 2(d) of the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 
165. In the cases contemplated here, one might argue that an unlawful phone search does not fall within the 
“law enforcement” justification for the collection in s. 26(b) of the Act and that exclusion in s. 3(h) of the 
act for “a record relating to a prosecution if all proceedings in respect of the prosecution have not been 
completed” would not apply to data gathered in the course of a prosecution which bore no “relation” or 
relevance to it. The Commissioner can issue an order to destroy records under s. 58(3)(f). For analogous 
provisions in Ontario, see ss. 39, 41, and 59(b)(ii) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act, RSO 1990, c F 31; see also the Privacy Act, RSC, 1985 c P-21, ss. 3, 4, and 29.  
116 See, e.g. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, The Case for Reforming the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, May 2013) at 7. 
117 Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692 (1981) at 705, n 19, 101 S Ct 2587 (quoting Dunaway v New York, 
442 US 200 (1979) at 219–220, 99 S Ct 2248 (White J concurring)), cited in Riley, supra note 11 at 22. 
118 For an argument calling into question whether the Court’s analysis in Fearon was already rendered 
obsolete by technology appearing when it was decided, see Fehr & Biden, supra note 43. The authors write, 
at 100, that “identity protection functions,” such as touch and face-ID, “raise additional constitutional 
concerns about the rights to silence and against self-incrimination, as well as provide additional privacy 
interests that were not given weight by either the majority or the dissent in Fearon.” 
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Part II: Device searches at the border 
 
The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is authorized to carry out searches under 
various pieces of legislation, including the Criminal Code,119 the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act,120 and the Customs Act.121 The focus in this section is on its 
powers under the latter Act. I begin with the legal framework supporting the CBSA’s 
current claim to authority to search devices at the border, without a warrant and 
without grounds. I cite evidence to demonstrate the practical effect of these searches. 
I then discuss an emerging consensus around the need to add a requirement for 
reasonable suspicion. I conclude by arguing that a reasonable search under search 8 of 
the Charter requires a warrant on probable grounds. 
 
 The cornerstone of CBSA’s argument as to the legality of its search of devices 
at the border is the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Simmons,122 which is the leading 
authority on search at the border. Simmons dealt with a challenge to strip search 
provisions in an earlier version of the Customs Act. Chief Justice Dickson held that: 
 
the degree of personal privacy reasonably expected at customs is lower than 
in most other situations. People do not expect to be able to cross 
international borders free from scrutiny. It is commonly accepted that 
sovereign states have the right to control both who and what enter their 
boundaries.123 
 
Drawing on US jurisprudence, he held that “border searches lacking prior 
authorization and based on a standard lower than probable cause are justified by the 
national interests of sovereign states in preventing the entry of undesirable persons and 
prohibited goods, and in protecting tariff revenue.”124  
 
Chief Justice Dickson then set out a framework for assessing searches at the 
border which is foundational to later jurisprudence: 
 
It is, I think, of importance that the cases and the literature seem to recognize 
three distinct types of border search. First is the routine of questioning which 
every traveller undergoes at a port of entry, accompanied in some cases by 
a search of baggage and perhaps a pat or frisk of outer clothing. No stigma 
is attached to being one of the thousands of travellers who are daily routinely 
checked in that manner upon entry to Canada and no constitutional issues 
are raised. It would be absurd to suggest that a person in such circumstances 
is detained in a constitutional sense and therefore entitled to be advised of 
his or her right to counsel. The second type of border search is the strip or 
                                                 
119 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
120 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. 
121 Customs Act, supra note 13.  
122 R v Simmons, [1988] 2 SCR 495, 55 DLR (4th) 673 [Simmons]. 
123 Ibid at para 49. 
124 Ibid at para 48.  
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skin search of the nature of that to which the present appellant was subjected, 
conducted in a private room, after a secondary examination and with the 
permission of a customs officer in authority. The third and most highly 
intrusive type of search is that sometimes referred to as the body cavity 
search, in which customs officers have recourse to medical doctors, to X-
rays, to emetics, and to other highly invasive means.125   
 
The Court in this case was concerned with a search of the second type.126 Strip searches 
on reasonable suspicion were held to be reasonable under section 8 in light of the 
compelling state interest in policing the border, especially “illicit narcotics 
trafficking”,127 as well as other safeguards in the Act, including provision for a second 
opinion on reasonable grounds from a superior officer.128 In setting out this framework, 
however, the Court also affirmed the validity of cursory searches of a person and their 
goods without grounds or a warrant. 
 
Later courts have added important glosses to the Simmons framework that are 
relevant here. In R v Hudson,129 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Simmons 
schema entails “discrete categories and not a continuum” – requiring a decision about 
classification before deciding on the “level of constitutional protection engaged.”130 
Courts have also distinguished between a “secondary search”, or one that takes place 
at a remove from the main passageway in a border area, and a search of the second 
type contemplated in Simmons.131 Case law on the scope of a category 1 search in 
Simmons is copious, but the boundaries are unclear. Among the examples of what is 
permissible, aside from a frisk or pat-down search, are a cursory search of baggage or 
                                                 
125 Ibid at para 27. Dickson CJC’s comment that “no constitutional issues are raised” by a search of the first 
type has been the source of confusion and disagreement among lower courts as to whether a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy at the first stage. (See, e.g. R v Jones, 81 OR (3d) 481, 41 CR (6th) 84 
(Ont CA), holding there to be no REP at stage 1, and R v Nagle, 2012 BCCA 373, 266 CRR (2d) 257 
applying a section 8 analysis to a stage 1 search.) See Robert Currie, “Electronic Devices at the Border: The 
Next Frontier of Canadian Search and Seizure Law?” (2016) 14:2 CJLT 289 at 302 [Currie, Electronic 
Devices at the Border], who suggests that Dickson CJC meant here that no issue is raised in terms of 
detention. Currie also notes that the passage pre-dates the Court’s framework for a s. 8 analysis, beginning 
with R v Edwards, [1996] 1 SCR 128, 132 DLR (4th) 31 in which REP is determined as a threshold question 
for s. 8.  
126 Simmons, supra note 122 at para 28; Dickson CJC added a proviso with respect to the other categories: 
“I wish to make it clear that each of the different types of search raises different issues. We are here 
concerned with searches of the second type and what I have to say relates only to that type of search. 
Searches of the third or bodily cavity type may raise entirely different constitutional issues for it is obvious 
that the greater the intrusion, the greater must be the justification and the greater the degree of constitutional 
protection.” 
127 Ibid at para 52. 
128 Ibid at para 54. 
129 R v Hudson (2005), 77 OR (3d) 561, 137 CRR (2d) 215 (Ont CA) [Hudson]. 
130 Ibid at para 30. 
131 Dehghani v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 SCR 1053, 101 DLR (4th) 
654.  
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purses, pockets, and the tapping of exterior parts of a car or truck to detect a hidden 
compartment.132  
 
 The CBSA claims authority to search a device and its data under sections 
99(1)(a) and 99.3(1) of the Customs Act.133 The argument is twofold. Section 99(1)(a) 
allows an officer to “examine any goods that have been imported”; 99.3(1) permits a 
“non-intrusive examination of goods” in “custody or possession” of a person in a 
“customs controlled area.”134 Section 2 of the Act defines “goods” to include “any 
document in any form”, and data on a device is considered a “document”.135 A number 
of trial courts across Canada have agreed with this interpretation, holding section 
99(1)(a) or 99.3(1) (or both) to be sufficient authority for device searches.136 As a 
result, when CBSA officials search data on a device, they do so without any limits 
imposed by the Act, aside from the vague requirement that the search be “non-
intrusive” if performed pursuant to 99.3(1) (which applies only in a “customs 
controlled area”).137 Courts have held device searches under these provisions to be a 
category 1 search in Simmons, no different in essence from an officer glancing inside 
a bag or a purse.138 
 
 In June of 2015, the CBSA issued an internal Operational Bulletin that sheds 
further light on its legal position and practices. Titled “Examination of Digital Devices 
and Media at the Port of Entry – Guidelines”,139 the document begins by asserting that 
                                                 
132 Hudson, supra note 129; R v Sekhon, 2009 BCCA 187, 189 CRR (2d) 176.  
133 Customs Act, supra note 13. 
134 Ibid, ss. 99(1)(a), 99.3(1). The Customs Act was amended in 2001 and in 2009 to allow for the designation 
and implementation of a “customs controlled area” (CCA) to address concerns about airport staff colluding 
with organized crime in illicit conduct. Within a CCA, both travelers and staff can be searched. An area of 
an airport or port of entry can be designated under regulation as a CCA, and several have been designated 
thus far: see the list at <https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/cca-zcd/menu-cca-zcd-eng.html>, 
which includes areas in all of Canada’s major airports. For context on the addition of CCAs in the Customs 
Act, see the “Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement” which appears as a schedule to the Customs Controlled 
Areas Regulations, SOR/2013-127, Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, (2013) C Gaz II, 1834.  
135 Customs Act, supra note 13, s 2.  
136 R v Gibson, 2017 BCPC 237 at paras 94–98, 141 WCB (2d) 238 [Gibson]; R v Buss, 2014 BCPC 16 at 
para 25-31, 301 CRR (2d) 309 [Buss]; R v Moroz, 2012 ONSC 5642 at paras 20–22, [2012] OJ No 4843 
[Moroz]; and R v Saikaley, 2012 ONSC 6794 at paras 79–82, OJ No 6024 [Saikaley]; R v Whittaker, 2010 
NBPC 32 at para 8, 367 NBR (2d) 334; R v Mozo (2010), 316 Nfld & PEIR 304 at para 34; 2010 
CarswellNfld 447 (NL Prov Ct) [Mozo]; and R v Leask, 2008 ONCJ 25 at para 7 and note 3, 167 CRR (2d) 
267. In all of these cases aside from Mozo, the only authority cited is section 99(1)(a). In Mozo, both 99(1)(a) 
and 99.3(1) were held to be adequate authority. This was likely an error premised on a misunderstanding of 
the term “customs controlled area” (contained in s. 99.3(1)). Addressing this point at 19, Judge Kennedy 
wrote: “After hearing all the evidence, I am satisfied that the presence of the BSOs conducting an 
inspection/search of the vessel in the context of how the inspection took place is sufficient to conclude that 
the area of the inspection/search was a controlled area.”  
137 Customs Act, supra note 13 at s. 99.3(1).  
138 See, e.g. Buss, supra note 136 at para 30; Gibson, supra note 136 at para 198. 
139 Canada Border Services Agency, “Examination of Digital Devices and Media at the Port of Entry – 
Guidelines”, Operational Bulletin PRG-2015-31 (30 June 2015) [Guidelines]. The Guidelines came to light 
through an access to information reported by the BC Civil Liberties Association in August of 2016, but the 
Ministry of Public Safety confirmed its currency in February of 2017, as did Martin Bolduc, Vice-President 
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CBSA officials have authority under section 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act to examine 
device data as a form of “good” under section 2 of the Act.140 It also cites section 
139(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act141 as additional authority for a 
device search. This section allows for a search of “personal effects” where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe a person has “not revealed their identity or has hidden 
on or about their person documents that are relevant to their admissibility”.142 But the 
Guidelines proceed to call for restraint in the exercise of these powers, indicating that:  
 
[a]lthough there is no defined threshold for grounds to examine [digital] 
devices, CBSA’s current policy is that such examinations should not be 
conducted as a matter of routine; they may only be conducted if there is a 
multiplicity of indicators that evidence of contraventions may be found on 
the digital device or media.143  
 
The Guidelines also require a “clear nexus to administering or enforcing CBSA-
mandated program legislation”144 and that “[t]he officer’s notes shall clearly articulate 
the types of data examined, and their reason for doing so.”145 A “multiplicity of 
indicators” may also authorize “progressive examinations of digital devices”.146 
Officers must disable wireless radios on a device before proceeding to search, and if a 
traveler refuses a password, the device may be detained under section 101 of the Act.147 
The officers are advised that “[u]ntil further instructions are issued,” they are not to 
arrest a traveler for refusing.148 
 
There is some evidence, however, that the Guidelines are not being applied 
strictly – that searches are more routine than the document implies – and the searches 
                                                 
of CBSA’s Programs Branch in submissions to Parliament in September of 2017. See Michael Vonn, “What 
Happens If You Don’t Provide Your Cellphone Password to Border Agents?” (25 August 2016), British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association (blog), online: <https://bccla.org/2016/08/what-happens-if-you-dont-
provide-your-cellphone-password-to-border-agents/>; Matthew Braga, “Canadian Policies on Cellphone 
Searches at Border Aren’t Easy to Find”, CBC News (17 February 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news> 
[Braga, “Policies on Cellphone Searches”]; and Matthew Braga, “Canada’s Border Agency to Start Tracking 
the Number of Cellphone Searches”, CBC News (28 September 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news> [Braga, 
“Tracking Cellphone Searches”]. A more recent but amended version can be found online < 
https://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CBSA-FOI-Docs.pdf >. 
140 Guidelines, supra note 139 at 1. 
141 IRPA, supra note 120. 
142 Ibid at s. 139(1). 
143 Guidelines, supra note 139 at 1 [emphasis added]. 
144 Ibid at 1. 
145 Ibid at 2. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid at 3, 4. 
148 Ibid at 4. The full passage reads: “Until further instructions are issued, CBSA officers shall not arrest a 
traveller for hindering (Section 153.1 of the Customs Act) or for obstruction (paragraph 129(1)(d) of IRPA) 
solely for refusing to provide a password. Though such actions appear to be legally supported, a restrained 
approach will be adopted until the matter is settled in ongoing court proceedings.”  
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are often invasive. In the 2017 British Columbia Provincial Court decision of R v 
Gibson,149 two CBSA officers testified in some detail about their general practice in 
relation to the search of devices. The searches in this case took place in November 
2014 (pre-dating the Guidelines) at the Pacific Highway border crossing in Surrey, 
British Columbia – but the trial took place in March and November of 2016.150 
Notably, Border Security Officers Randhawa and Louis speak of their general practice 
in relation to devices in the present tense. The accused, Gibson, had been referred to 
secondary inspection,151 where the officers searched his phone, digital camera, and 
laptop. Associate Chief Judge Gillespie, summarizing Randhawa’s evidence, stated 
that the officer believed that section 99(1)(a) 
 
permitted him to search electronic media for child pornography or anything 
that is illegal. He also understood that there were no limitations on what he 
could look for in reviewing the phone or camera. He was free to look at 
intimate pictures of people on phones and in media on other devices. BSO 
Randhawa testified that if he came across images where two adults were 
performing a consensual sexual act, he would not generally look at it, as, in 
his view, it was none of his business.152  
 
Randhawa also testified that: 
 
he “regularly” inspects “people’s Smartphones or iPhones”, and that he does 
so in the course of a “routine Customs examination” looking for contraband, 
or anything that “indicates to us, basically, there is contraband, there is child 
porn, there is smuggling activity, or there is intelligence in regards to some 
sort of a – an offence that might occur on a later date.”153   
 
On the general routine of the search: 
 
[h]e would check messages looking to see if there was any history of 
messages about the “traveller’s story”. Then he would look at the 
images/photos on the phone. In the past, when he has reviewed the images 
he has found on cellular devices, he has observed “lots of illegal activity”, 
such as people trafficking in drugs, taking photos of contraband drugs, and 
images of child pornography.154 
 
 
 
                                                 
149 Gibson, supra note 136. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid at para 9. Gibson was searched on the basis of suspicions raised by, among other things, the fact that 
he had taken a long bus journey across the United States only crossing in Vancouver, with the intention to 
stay for three days, that he was carrying a large amount of luggage and he was travelling on a new passport.  
152 Ibid at para 11. 
153 Ibid at para 15. 
154 Ibid at para 16. 
118 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 69 
Summarizing the evidence of the second officer, Louis, Justice Gillespie wrote: 
 
In the past, BSO Louis has reviewed hundreds of electronic devices at the 
border, perhaps in excess of a thousand.  He generally approaches the review 
of [a] cellular device by looking at the messages to determine if they are 
consistent with the traveller’s stated reason for entering the country.  He 
looks at emails and text messages that have already been received and are 
stored on the phone itself.  He does not have a specific practice about how 
far back he scrolls in the messages.  Generally, he commences his review by 
examining the most recent ten to twenty messages.  He also looks at the 
photos and videos that are stored on the device.  He usually looks at the 
thumbnails of the images unless something specifically catches his eye.  If 
he sees nothing that evidences a possible contravention under any of the 
Acts he enforces, he then concludes his examination.155  
 
Louis is said to conduct “between five to twelve secondary examinations a shift” but 
that “[i]t was not ‘one hundred percent routine for him to search a traveller’s electronic 
media’”.156 There was no discussion of a “multiplicity of indicators” or any other 
grounds. The case makes no mention of the Guidelines. 
 
 This evidence is dated, impressionistic, and involves a very small sample. 
But it calls into question the practical effect of a standard as vague as “a multiplicity 
of indicators that may” point to contraventions. It also sheds light on the potential 
effect of a legal framework in which the scope of device searches is unlimited. 
 
 
Charter concerns and proposals for reform  
 
From the mid-2000s onward, courts have held that warrantless and groundless 
searches of devices under the Customs Act are reasonable.157 Yet as Robert Currie has 
pointed out, a discrepancy begins to appear from Morelli onward, as courts have failed 
to effectively reconcile the Supreme Court’s recognition of a heightened privacy 
interest in computers with the allowance in Simmons for cursory searches without 
grounds.158 Arguments among defence counsel to the effect that the higher privacy 
interest calls for a standard of some kind have fallen flat. So too have concerns about 
groundless and limitless searches failing to perform the prophylactic function noted in 
Hunter v Southam159 of avoiding unnecessary breaches before they occur. 
 
Robert Currie has argued that while the privacy interest in a computer may 
not be as high as in a strip search, it remains high enough to call for distinct treatment 
                                                 
155 Ibid at para 22. 
156 Ibid at para 23. 
157 See the cases cited in note 136. 
158 This would include Moroz, Saikaley, Buss, and Gibson, supra note 136. See also Currie, Electronic 
Devices at the Border, supra note 125 at 306. 
159 Hunter, supra note 16. 
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under the Customs Act. He proposes the Act be amended to make clear that data on a 
device is not “‘goods’”.160 Drawing on the Supreme Court’s sniffer dog cases as a 
framework (R v Kang–Brown,161 R v A.M.,162 and R v Chehil163), he proposes reading 
into sections 99(1)(a) and 99.3(1) a requirement for reasonable suspicion.164 This is 
the requisite basis for other searches under the Customs Act, including a strip search.165 
He also proposes limiting the search to “the more basic apps on the device – sent and 
draft emails and texts, photos, call logs, note-taking apps and anything similar.”166  
 
 In the fall of 2017, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access 
to Information, Privacy and Ethics held hearings to address the issue of device searches 
at the border. The CBSA made submissions outlining its practices as set out in the 2015 
Guidelines, including its requirement for a “multiplicity of indicators”. In the course 
of hearings, the CBSA confirmed that it had not been keeping statistics about the 
number and nature of searches, but had begun to do so weeks earlier and would make 
this public in due course.167 The Committee’s report, tabled in December of 2017, 
acknowledges the thrust of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on the high privacy 
interest in digital devices and concerns about the “lack of clear rules in the Customs 
Act.”168 But the Committee appears not to have probed the CBSA’s position in much 
depth – omitting any discussion in the report of the Agency’s need to conduct device 
searches, or the effectiveness of searches being conducted. The report also suggests a 
consensus around reasonable suspicion as an appropriate standard for device searches, 
though at least one witness proposed that a warrant be required.169 Among the 
Committee’s recommendations were that CBSA’s 2015 Guidelines “be written into 
the Customs Act.”170 Yet the Committee also recommended that the standard of a 
“multiplicity of indicators” be replaced with “reasonable grounds to suspect.”171 A 
                                                 
160 Currie, Electronic Devices at the Border, supra note 125 at 316. 
161 R v Kang-Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 SCR 456. 
162 R v AM, 2008 SCC 19, [2008] 1 SCR 569.  
163 R v Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2012] 3 SCR 220.  
164 Currie, Electronic Devices at the Border, supra note 125 at 310–11. 
165 Customs Act, supra note 13 at s. 99(1)(a). 
166 Currie, Electronic Devices at the Border, supra note 125 at 312. 
167 Braga, “Tracking Cellphone Searches”, supra note 139. 
168 Protecting Canadians’ Privacy, supra note 14 at 5.  
169 Ibid at 9 and 10. Brenda McPhail, for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, is cited as suggesting a 
warrant requirement at 10.  
170 Ibid at 11.  
171 Ibid. Among the other recommendations was, at 13, a call upon the government to track the number of 
device searches at the border and provide the information to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Another, 
at 22, was that “the Government of Canada consider establishing internal privacy and civil liberties officers 
within the Canada Border Services Agency to monitor privacy issues at the agency level.” 
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further key recommendation was for the government to track the number of device 
searches and provide regular updates to the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.172 
 
 Recent events in the United States present a notable contrast to this approach. 
Device searches at the US border have been rising rapidly in recent years, causing 
concern among Americans.173 In response, a bi-partisan bill, titled the Protecting Data 
at the Border Act, was tabled in Congress in April of 2017.174 It requires border agents 
to obtain a warrant on probable grounds before searching a device. The bill would also 
prohibit denying entry for refusal to provide a password or unlock a device, require 
officers to notify travelers of the right to refuse requests to provide access, require 
probable grounds for confiscating a device, and prohibit the admission of evidence 
obtained in violation of the bill.175 The bill is currently in committee stage in both 
chambers.  
 
 The bill represents a notable contrast to debates about law in Canada because 
it reflects a different set of assumptions about both privacy and the state interest in the 
search of a device at the border. A warrant requirement to conduct even a limited search 
implies a view – consistent with that set out in Riley – that the state’s interest in 
immediate access to data in this context is not pressing. It also implies a view that the 
fruits of warrantless data searches at the border do not generally outweigh the privacy 
interests engaged in such searches. The bill sets out a concept of reasonable search 
premised on facts and assumptions that apply equally in Canada.  
 
 
Why the reasonable search of a device should require a warrant, even at the 
border 
 
The option of adopting the reasonable suspicion standard has much to commend it, 
including its consistency with other invasive searches in the Customs Act. But in what 
follows, I argue that section 8 of the Charter requires a warrant on probable grounds 
for device searches at the border, except in exigent circumstances. The argument is 
threefold. 
 
First, the search of a device is close in nature to a strip search, and among the 
most invasive searches possible. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Morelli to Vu, and both the dissent and the majority in Fearon. On behalf of the 
                                                 
172 Ibid at 13. 
173 US Customs and Border Protection, “CBP Releases Updated Border Search of Electronic Device 
Directive and FY17 Statistics”, (5 January 2018) noting 30 200 device searches for fiscal year 2017 – an 
increase from 8503 in 2015, and 19 033 in 2016. See also Kaveh Waddell, “The Steady Rise of Digital 
Border Searches”, The Atlantic (12 April 2017), online: <www.theatlantic.com>, “the rate of digital border 
searches is in on pace to quadruple since 2015.” 
174 US, Bill S 823, Protecting Data at the Border Act, 115th Cong 2017–2018; Adam Schwartz and Sophia 
Cope, “Pass the Protecting Data at the Border Act” (28 September 2017) The Hill (blog), online: 
<www.thehill.com>.  
175 Ibid. 
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majority in Fearon, Justice Cromwell did state that a device search is “not as invasive 
as a strip search.”176 But he did so at the end of his discussion of the differences 
between the two kinds of search. In the course of that discussion, his point was more 
nuanced: “while cell phone searches […] may constitute very significant intrusions of 
privacy, not every search is inevitably a significant intrusion.”177 Which is to say that 
some of them can be; further on, he conceded: “[a]ll of that said, the search of a cell 
phone has the potential to be a much more significant invasion of privacy than the 
typical search incident to arrest.”178 Justice Karakatsanis, in dissent, was more overt in 
asserting an equivalence between device and strip searches. She drew the analogy 
twice, including the claim that “like the search of a private home, a strip search or the 
seizure of bodily samples, the search of the portal to our digital existence is invasive 
and impacts major privacy interests. The privacy interest in a cell phone or other digital 
communication and storage device is extremely high.”179 Supreme Court authority 
clearly favours placing device searches very close to strip searches, or not far below 
them. 
 
 If a device search is close to a strip search, why should a device search at the 
border require more than reasonable suspicion when a strip search requires only that? 
The response is that a limited data search (tied to a law enforcement objective) is not 
practicable; and more crucially, the state interest in searching a device at the border is 
lower than it is in the search of a person. 
 
 Justice Karakatsanis was correct to assert in Fearon that it is “very difficult—
if not impossible—to perform a meaningfully constrained targeted or cursory 
inspection of a cell phone or other personal digital device.”180 Since messages can be 
communicated through many different apps and platforms, an attempt to limit a search 
to recent messages or emails will likely still entail an inspection of “a host of 
applications” in a search that is “far from minimal and [an] inspection far from 
quick.”181 Moreover, “a cursory inspection of photos may involve any number of 
private and personal photographs of the individual—and of third parties.”182 The US 
Supreme Court in Riley cast a similar doubt on the merits of limited searches of 
devices, holding that such an approach would “impose few meaningful constraints on 
officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal of information, and 
officers would not always be able to discern in advance what information would be 
found where.”183 
                                                 
176 Fearon, supra note 5 at para 63. 
177 Ibid at para 54. 
178 Ibid at para 58. 
179 Ibid at para 134. See also para 152, “like the search of the body and of the home, the warrantless search 
of personal digital devices as an incident of arrest is not proportionate to our privacy interests.” 
180 Ibid at para 164. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Riley, supra note 11 at 24. 
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 More crucially, the state’s interest in searching a device at the border is less 
pressing than it is in searching a person’s body. In Simmons, Chief Justice Dickson 
accorded significant weight to the state interest in a strip search “[i]n light of the 
existing problems in controlling illicit narcotics trafficking and the important 
government interest in enforcing our customs laws”.184 Yet vital to this assessment was 
the simple fact that people often use their bodies as vessels for importing illicit goods. 
Whereas the state has a pressing need to carry out a strip search to prevent drug or 
weapons smuggling, the same cannot be said for child pornography or other illicit 
data.185 Obviously, the vast majority of illicit data that enters Canada does so through 
the internet.186 A cursory glance at the cases on device searches at the border will show 
that most involve accused persons of seemingly limited technical savvy caught in 
possession of relatively small amounts of child pornography – and thus not cases of 
sophisticated hackers who thought it best to physically import their data rather than 
use a virtual private network, a secured socket layer or encrypted tunnel, and so 
forth.187 Nor is it clear from the case law that device searches are meaningfully 
assisting in the prevention of conventional customs violations by affording officers 
evidence pointing to drug or weapons trafficking offences. The state’s interest in 
interception at the border is thus far less pressing and more speculative in any given 
case of a person carrying a device than it is where there is a reasonable suspicion of 
smuggling contraband.188 
                                                 
184 Simmons, supra note 122 at para 52. 
185 A number of scholars have made this point in the Canadian and American contexts (and in the latter case, 
at least as far back as 2008). In relation to Canada, see Steven Penney, “‘Mere Evidence’? Why Customs 
Searches of Digital Devices Violate Section 8 of the Charter” (2016) 49:1 UBC L Rev 485 at 510 [Penney, 
“Mere Evidence”]; in relation to the US, see Thomas Mann Miller, “Digital Border Searches After Riley v. 
California” (2015) 90 Wash L Rev 1943 at 1991–2; Janet C. Hoeffel and Stephen Singer, “Fear and 
Loathing at the U.S. Border” (2013) 82:4 Miss LJ 1 at 13; Victoria Wilson, “Laptops and the Border Search 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment: Protecting the United States Borders From Bombs, Drugs, and the 
Pictures From Your Vacation” (2011) 65 U Miami L Rev 999 at 1017; and Rasha Alzahabi, “Should You 
Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad?: The Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of 
Laptop Computers” (2008) 41:1 Ind L Rev 161 at 177. 
186 Penney, “Mere Evidence”, supra note 185 at 510–11: “The overwhelming proportion of child 
pornography and other digital contraband moves through the internet, not customs. Even if officials 
managed to intercept every incoming digital child pornography file at customs, it would do next to nothing 
to stem the availability (and concomitant harms) of child pornography in Canada.” 
187 There are, to my knowledge, nine reported decisions involving device searches at the border. Including 
the seven cases listed in supra note 136, two additional cases are R v Appleton (2011), 97 WCB (2d) 444, 
2011 CarswellOnt 11191 (ONCJ), and R v Bares, 2008 CanLII 9367 (Ont Sup Ct) (involving the search of 
CDs rather than a device). Seven of the nine cases deal with searches that discover files containing child 
pornography; in Appleton, the search at issue involves a text message. In Saikaley, supra note 136, the 
CBSA recovers a debt list from a suspected drug-dealer’s phone, but they were acting on information 
gleaned from a wiretap and an earlier investigation by the RCMP. I note that the list of device search cases 
in this paper is consistent with Robert Currie’s inventory, supra note 125 at 300, with the addition of the 
more recent R v Gibson, supra note 136.  
188 One possible exception to this is the potential utility of a device search where border officers believe a 
person is concealing their identity. Even cursory details gleaned from a device search – the language of the 
operating system, the apps on the phone, etc. – could offer meaningful assistance in this case (including the 
traveler’s past whereabouts). The power to search under section 139(1) of the IRPA, supra note 120, should 
thus be considered distinct from Customs Act powers. Yet given the high privacy interest involved in a 
device and the likelihood that a categorical rule would be a more effective means of avoiding unreasonable 
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 It may seem counter-intuitive to assert that while a strip search can be carried 
out under the Customs Act on reasonable suspicion, a device search should require a 
warrant. But, to be clear, the difference is premised not on which search is more 
invasive, but rather which search is more pressing. Drug and weapons smuggling are 
common and can only occur physically. Body searches are often necessary to prevent 
these acts and often effective. The evidence of CBSA officials noted above (from R v 
Gibson) suggests that device searches are occurring frequently, yet the number of cases 
dealing with charges for illicit data captured in the course of device searches at the 
border is very small. CBSA officials are searching devices not because they serve an 
effective law enforcement purpose comparable to preventing drug or weapons 
smuggling, but because they assume it is a reasonable extension of their powers under 
the Act. No decided case in Canada has cited evidence as to the pressing need to carry 
out device searches at the border on the basis of the significant threat they pose as 
vessels for illicit material or their effectiveness in the aid of law enforcement.189 These 
points are often made and rarely questioned.190 
 
The Customs Act should thus be amended to allow for a device search only 
with a warrant on probable grounds, except in exigent circumstances.191 The additional 
protections set out in the Protecting Data at the Border Act, noted above, would also 
be appropriate. The right to be free from an unreasonable device search would thus be 
better protected in Canada if the Customs Act were to include a prohibition on denying 
entry for refusing to provide a password; a requirement of probable grounds to seize a 
                                                 
searches, here too a warrant requirement would be preferable to the current requirement (under section 139) 
of reasonable grounds. 
189 And as noted above, nor did the Committee report, Protecting Canadians’ Privacy, supra note 14. This 
may be due in part due to a lack of record keeping on the part of the CBSA, a situation that officials promised 
in the course 2017 Parliamentary hearings to rectify: Braga, “Tracking Cellphone Searches”, supra note 
139. 
190 There are a number of challenges unfolding in the United States to the validity of device searches at the 
border under the Fourth Amendment, including Alasaad v Duke, No 1:17-cv-11730 (Mass Dist Ct 2018) 
and United States v Molina-Isidoro, No. 17-50070 (5th Cir 2018). In both cases, the government makes the 
same assertion that CBSA makes here: i.e., that groundless searches are reasonable in light of the state 
interest in immediate access to data at the border. Yet the claim is seldom if ever substantiated. For example, 
among the documents cited in the government’s materials in Alasaad is a 2018 US Customs and Border 
Protection directive which states that devices searches are “essential to enforcing the law […] They help 
detect evidence relating to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash smuggling, 
contraband, and child pornography.” US Customs and Border Protection, Border Search of Electronic 
Devices (CBP Directive No 3340-049A) (2018) at 1. Nowhere in the document is there evidence of the 
number of searches conducted or the amount of material found or its nature. Similar assertions about urgency 
and necessity are made without evidence in Homeland Security’s more extensive 2018 update, US Customs 
and Border Protection, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic Devices 
(DHS/CBP/PIA-008(a) (January 4, 2018). For context on the cases, “ACLU & EFF Sue Over Warrantless 
Phone and Laptop Searches at U.S. Border” (13 September 2017), ACLU (blog), online: 
<www.aclu.org/news/aclu-eff-sue-over-warrantless-phone-and-laptop-searches-us-border; and Electronic 
Frontier Foundation> and “EFF to Court: Border Agents Need Warrants to Search Contents of Digital 
Devices” (8 August 2017), EFF (blog), online: < www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-court-border-agents-need-
warrants-search-contents-digital-devices>.  
191 The exception for searches in exigent circumstances that Karakatsanis J set out for the dissent in Fearon, 
supra note 5 at para 179, would be appropriate here: reasonable suspicion of imminent harm; reasonable 
belief of imminent danger that evidence would be destroyed. 
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phone (pending a warrant on probable grounds); and strict limits on how long a device 
can be held without a warrant. Courts dealing with exclusion applications under 
section 24(2) of the Charter, in cases where phones have been unlawfully searched, 
should lend significant weight to the privacy interests in a device, in accordance with 
the Supreme Court’s holdings from Morelli onward. Courts should generally be 
reluctant to admit evidence obtained from warrantless border device searches (contrary 
to section 8) where the searches are more than cursory (recent texts, emails, and 
photos).  
 
 
Remedies for an unreasonable border search? 
 
The prospect of an unlawful – or unreasonable – device search at the border presents 
a distinct set of concerns from those at issue in the context of search incident to arrest. 
In the latter case, a device searched on arrest may lead to a trial and a finding under 
section 8. The majority’s test in Fearon will serve as a gauge for the legality of the 
search, forming a basis for assessing the severity of the breach in relation to police 
conduct. In addition to the exclusion of evidence, the subject of a search might in 
theory seek damages under section 24(1) of the Charter, or in tort, or make a complaint 
to a police oversight body or to a privacy commissioner.  
 
The avenues for redress or a remedy in the case of an invasive and 
unreasonable device search at the border are less clear. Given that device searches can 
be lawfully conducted at present without grounds, there is no basis for damages under 
the Charter or in tort. There may, however, be a basis to complain about the conduct 
of CBSA officers in relation to the Guidelines noted above.192 Serious intrusions into 
privacy are thus often occurring without recourse. 
 
 
Part III: Conclusion 
 
Current authority in Canadian law for device searches on arrest and at the border is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings from Morelli onward on the privacy 
interest in computers. Adding to earlier criticism of Fearon and of current border 
device search law and policy, this paper has sought to demonstrate that searches are 
being carried out in both contexts without clear limits, leading to significantly invasive 
state intrusions into personal privacy, and without effective avenues of recourse. New 
technologies of data protection may soon provide the Supreme Court an opportunity 
to revisit its holding in Fearon.193 If so, the Court should adopt the dissent’s 
recommendation for a warrant except in exigent circumstances as a means of 
                                                 
192 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada recommends that if one has concerns about the 
manner in which a search is carried out by CBS border agents – e.g. in a manner inconsistent with the 
Guidelines noted above – a person might submit comments through an online feedback and complaint form 
with the Canada border services agency at: <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/contact/feedback-retroaction-
eng.html>. 
193 Fehr & Biden, supra note 43. 
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addressing the dissent’s concerns about the practical effects of the rule which this 
paper has sought to substantiate.  
 
Parliament should amend the Customs Act to provide clearer guidance on 
CBSA authority for device searches at the border. But it should be skeptical of the 
CBSA’s claims to having a pressing interest in data searches, comparable to its interest 
in physical searches. The salient point in this context is not whether a device search is 
less invasive than a strip search, but whether it is necessary or effective in ways 
comparable to a body or container search. Parliamentarians need to ask why border 
officials need immediate access to people’s data, and what past practice in this regard 
has tended to reveal. If several years of a substantial number of searches has resulted 
in only a small number of cases, mostly involving child pornography, clearly the need 
to carry out immediate (warrantless) searches is more theoretical than practical. A 
reasonable search here – one that balances the high privacy interest in personal devices 
with a theoretical state interest in access in the vast majority of cases – is one that 
should require a warrant on probable grounds, except in exigent circumstances. 
 
Until these reforms are adopted, invasive searches will continue to occur in 
both contexts and without accessible or effective remedies. In the absence of these 
changes to the law, it may be that, for many people, technology itself will offer the 
most effective solution to the concerns raised in this article, in the form of pass-locks 
and encryption.194 But technology constantly evolves, and many devices continue to 
feature a level of access in the form of notifications and other data accessible without 
a passcode. Many people also continue to use their devices unlocked. There are thus 
various ways the state may gain access to device data on arrest or at the border despite 
attempts to avoid it. The constitutional protection of privacy therefore remains vital, 
and along with it, the need to constantly reassess the meaning of a reasonable search 
in the digital context. 
                                                 
194 In the case of Apple, beginning with iOS 9, all content stored on iPhones and iPads has been encrypted, 
making it more difficult for law enforcement to gain access. Analogous protections have been added to other 
platforms. For an argument that encryption may offer the best defence against state incursions into digital 
privacy, see Susan Landau, Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2017). 
